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THE DECLINE OF THE FISH/MAMMAL DISTINCTION?

SAMUEL BESWICK†
In response to Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982).
The public/private distinction was “slain” in 1982.1 That year, at the
Symposium of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Professor Duncan
Kennedy set forth his six Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction,
outlining the sequence by which liberal categorizations descend “from robust
good health to utter decrepitude.”2
Professor Kennedy’s famed article concerned the history of legal thought
over the course of the twentieth century. He described that history as one of
“decline”—not just of the public/private distinction, but of numerous other
distinctions said to “constitute the liberal way of thinking about the social
world.”3 He pronounced on the lifecycle of these ideas and the way in which
they—and the public/private distinction in particular—had become unjustifiable
in legal thought. It was “[h]ard cases with large stakes” that were the first sign
† Frank Knox Memorial Fellow, S.J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School. With thanks, for the
lively discussions and suggestions, to Duncan Kennedy, John C.P. Goldberg, Bharath Palle, Beatriz
Botero Arcila, Patrick R. Gould, Kári Ragnarsson, Pieter-Augustijn Van Malleghem, Lauren Brazier,
Malcolm Lavoie, Jennifer Allison, Jane Rabb, Rebecca Williams, and (especially) Steffi Sunny.
1 Or so we thought. See Christian Turner, Law’s Public/Private Structure, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1003,
1004-05 (2012) (arguing that “separating public from private is an inevitable task in any legal system”).
2 Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1349, 1350 (1982). Further elaboration of this critique is found in Pierre Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An
Essay on the Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REV. 929, 931 (1988) and also in
Gerald Turkel, The Public/Private Distinction: Approaches to the Critique of Legal Ideology, 22 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 801, 810-13 (1988).
3 His list of decrepit distinctions included “state/society, public/private, individual/group,
right/power, property/sovereignty, contract/tort, law/policy, legislature/judiciary, objective/subjective,
reason/fiat, [and] freedom/coercion.” Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1349.
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of trouble,4 precipitating compromise until distinctions all but collapsed,5
only to be reanimated as “continua” or pro/con “balancing” formulae6 until
they became something “we can’t believe in . . . any more.”7
In this Essay, I put to one side legal history and turn attention to the
process of decline itself. For it is not only legal distinctions that are
problematic. There are, indeed, many errant categorizations that fit the story
of decline.8 My target is the so-called fish/mammal distinction. “Fish,” it will
be shown, is an indistinct category. But if it nonetheless remains acceptable
for people (and biologists) to speak in terms of fish, might it be okay for
people (and lawyers) to speak in terms of private law?
I. NO SUCH THING AS A FISH
The decline of the phenomenon of “fish” has been attributed to
evolutionary biologist and paleontologist Professor Stephen Jay Gould who
deduced, “[a]fter a lifetime’s study,” that there is no such thing as a fish.9
Rather, there are five separate classes of aquatic vertebrate, which are “not at
all closely related to one another.”10 These classes, we surmise, diverged early
in the evolutionary chain. So an analytically astute observer would find that
a salmon is more closely related to a camel than it is to a hagfish.11 On what
basis, then, do we justify grouping salmon under the label fish, but not camels?
4
5
6
7
8

Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1351-52.
Id. at 1352-53.
Id. at 1353-54.
Cf. David L. Shapiro, The Death of the Up–Down Distinction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 465 (1984)
(providing a satirical critique, using the up/down distinction, of Professor Kennedy’s work); see also
Frank I. Michelman, Constitutions and the Public/Private Divide (postulating a “law for things ‘high’
and another for things ‘low’”), in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 298, 304 (Michel
Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012).
9 JOHN LLOYD & JOHN MITCHINSON, QI: THE SECOND BOOK OF GENERAL IGNORANCE
20 (2010); accord Carol Kaesuk Yoon, Science vs. Instinct, CONSERVATION (Nov. 19, 2009),
http://conservationmagazine.org/2009/11/science-vs-instinct/ [https://perma.cc/VC2U-E9VU]. Another
common misconception is that tomatoes and pumpkins are vegetables. They are, in fact, fruit. INT’L
AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, WORLD HEALTH ORG., FRUIT AND VEGETABLES 15
(2003). Unlike fish, however, fruit and vegetable are definable terms, and so they might be more
readily justifiable categories (in terms of Professor Kennedy’s schema).
10 Keith E. Banister & John Dawes, Fish, What is a? (“The five living groups consist of two
groups of jawless fishes—hagfishes and lampreys—and three groups with jaws—cartilaginous fishes
(sharks and rays), lobe-finned fishes (the coelacanths and lungfishes), and bony fishes (all the rest).
The last two groups possess bony, rather than cartilaginous, skeletons.”), in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF UNDERWATER LIFE (Andrew Campbell & John Dawes eds., 2007); see also Mark Westneat,
Fishes, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE, http://eol.org/info/fishes [https://perma.cc/XFE5-ZXMV] (“[W]e
usually know a fish when we see one, but there are lots of exceptions to our fishy definitions.”).
11 QI: Hoaxes (BBC television broadcast Oct. 1, 2010), https://youtu.be/uhwcEvMJz1Y
[https://perma.cc/9XPS-G4DE]; see also No Such Thing as a Fish, QI, http://qi.com/podcast
[https://perma.cc/9323-LX2M].
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1. Hard cases with large stakes are those about which people disagree
passionately as to which side of the distinction the case falls.12 In the
fish/mammal debate, there are categorizations that we may be tempted to
treat as “easy cases.”13 Everybody knows that a salmon is a fish. But since it is
not possible to define universal characteristics of “fish,” hard cases abound.14
Are eels fish or more like reptiles? Are dolphins fish as well as mammals? And
what of seahorses? Hard cases lead us to:
2. The development of intermediate terms. These become necessary when we
encounter cases that seem to “fit” both categorizations.15 Dolphins, we know,
are mammals, not fish. They are warm-blooded, they breath air using lungs,
and they give birth to live young.16 But the moonfish is warm-blooded,17
lungfish have air-breathing lungs,18 and guppies, mollies, and swordtails all
give birth to live young.19 So, might dolphins (and whales, and those like
them) be intermediate creatures?
3. Collapse of the fish/mammal distinction seems imminent once we accept
that even some of our most beloved animal species do not neatly categorize.
Trying to fit the terminology just results in “a situation of hopeless
contradiction.”20 If you assert that what makes fish unique is their scales and
fins, I will present to you the hagfish (which has neither)21 and the sailfin
lizard (which has both).22 If you assert that gills are the unifying feature,
confining fish to an aquatic environment, I will present to you the climbing
perch (which can live for six days out of water, as well as hibernate for up to
12
13

Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1350.
Cf. Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 416 (1985) (defining an “easy case”
in the constitutional context as “one in which a clearly applicable rule noncontroversially generates
an answer to the question at hand, and one in which the answer so generated is consistent both with
the purpose behind the rule and with the social, political, and moral climate in which the question
is answered”); see also United Fisheries Ltd. v. Comm’r of Inland Revenue (1985) 7 NZTC 5005 at
[5010] (N.Z.) per Somers J (dismissing the Revenue Commissioner’s submission that “fish and chips
may be a dinner; fish alone is not,” on the basis that the statutory phrase “prepared fish dinners” was
a question of fact, which was not amenable to appellate review).
14 And it is not hard to see how the stakes are large. Both when ordering animal physiology
and when ordering fish-steak at a restaurant, few would consider reindeer and tuna comparable.
15 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1351.
16 4 INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE ENCYCLOPEDIA 506-09 (3d ed. 2002).
17 Opah, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE (May 14, 2015), https://www.britannica.com/
animal/opah-fish-genus [https://perma.cc/B6M4-P6HW].
18 Karl Heinz Lüling, Lungfish, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, https://www.britannica.com/
animal/lungfish [https://perma.cc/V6SD-T7LP].
19 DAVID ALDERTON, LIVEBEARERS: UNDERSTANDING GUPPIES, MOLLIES, SWORDTAILS,
AND OTHERS 8 (2004).
20 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1351.
21 CECIE STARR ET AL., BIOLOGY: THE UNITY AND DIVERSITY OF LIFE 435 (12th ed. 2009).
22 PHILIPPE DE VOSJOLI, GREEN WATER DRAGONS: PLUS SAILFIN LIZARDS & BASILISKS
ch. 9 (1992); Hydrosaurus Pustulatus, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE, http://eol.org/pages/963478/
[https://perma.cc/CFN3-QLPP].
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six months in the mud of dried-up creek beds)23 and the various marine
invertebrates, such as shrimp, which would not commonly be called fish,
though they inhabit the same environment. Perhaps, then, we must resort to:
4. Continuumization—that is to say, no creature is absolutely a fish or not
a fish. There are fish-like creatures and there are creatures that bear less
resemblance to what we would traditionally call a fish. Categorization of
animals (like law) merely involves placing creatures (or legal issues) onto a
continuum between the two diametric poles of fish and nonfish (or private
law and public law).24 We can categorize creatures on this continuum “by
listing ‘factors’ that ‘cut’ one way or the other and must be ‘balanced.’”25 So
the climbing perch might fall on the fishier end of the continuum, owing to
its gills, scales, fins, tail, and aquatic preference, despite its ability to live on
land. Whereas shrimp, although they have gills, seem less fish-like—with
their legs and absence of scales, fins, and vertebra.
5. Stereotypification is the label Professor Kennedy ascribes to the maelstrom
into which we are descending. For the delineation I have just outlined shows
nothing more than an exercise of my personal value judgment. Reasonable
people might well disagree with my assertions that legs are not a fish-like
feature, or that gills are. The distinction comes down to my policy arguments
versus yours; or, rather, my political ideology versus yours.26 The climbing
perch, I say, is more a fish than is a shrimp because it fits my worldview of
what a fish is. To me, fish do not walk on legs (even though sometimes they
do).27 But under what meta-principle can we say that my categorization—my
worldview—is more correct than yours?
6. Loopification ensues “when one seems to be able to move by a steady
series of steps around the whole distinction, ending up where one started
without ever reversing direction.”28 The fish/mammal distinction typifies
loopification remarkably: for one can start with a salmon and, following out
the lines of similarity and difference, arrive at a biological link to a camel
before one reaches the hagfish. “Like wow, man,”29 indeed.

23 INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 16, at 468; Nathan Waltham,
Invasive “Walking” Fish that Suffocates Its Predators May Be Coming for Australia, IFL SCIENCE,
http://www.iflscience.com/plants-and-animals/resilient-climbing-perch-may-be-coming-australia/
[https://perma.cc/8XKY-AFKU].
24 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1352-53.
25 Id. at 1353.
26 Id. at 1353-54.
27 Fiona MacDonald, This Bizarre Fish with Legs Has Been Discovered off the Coast of New
Zealand, SCI. ALERT (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.sciencealert.com/this-bizarre-fish-with-legs-hasbeen-discovered-off-the-coast-of-new-zealand [https://perma.cc/64QB-RMV8].
28 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1354.
29 Id.
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II. SO IS THERE REALLY NO SUCH THING AS A FISH?
Should we, enlightened by our deconstruction of fish, implore society to
abandon use of the term altogether?30 What good is the fish/mammal
distinction when it does not neatly tell us how to designate a dolphin, or when
it can so easily be manipulated to one’s own preferences?
Do not despair just yet, dear reader. For we can gleam hope from the
threshold laid down in Professor Kennedy’s opening words:
Success for a legal distinction has two facets. First, it must be possible to
make the distinction: people must feel that it is intuitively sensible to divide
something between its poles, and that the division will come out pretty much
the same way regardless of who is doing it. Second, the distinction must make
a difference: a distinction without a difference is a failure even if it is possible
for everyone to agree every time on how to make it. Making a difference
means that it seems plain that situations should be treated differently
depending on which category of the distinction they fall into.31

Before we discard the fish/mammal distinction, we must ask ourselves these
two questions.
First, is it possible to distinguish fish from mammals? Yes! We know it is.
Children do this every day when visiting zoos and reading picture books. In
the great majority of cases, very little confusion or disagreement arises.
Everyone agrees how salmon and camels ought to be categorized.32 Although
seahorses present us with a hard case, they do not shatter the distinction—neither
society nor biology labs collapse over disagreements as to what seahorses are.
Second, is it plain that animals should be treated differently depending
on which category of the distinction they fall into? Absolutely! The
fish/mammal distinction is crucial to helping us make sense of the animal
kingdom (and dinner menus), and thus to helping us make wise decisions in
respect of them. It is plain that, despite their biological differences, salmon
and hagfish should be treated more similarly to each other than to camels. We
bring more sense to the world—not less—by calling both fish.
And just as the fish/mammal distinction has not descended into extinction,
perhaps we should not eagerly abandon the public/private or the other
categorizations eulogized by Professor Kennedy. Deconstructionism—valuable
as it is in uncovering biases and preconceptions—has not neutered liberal
30 And, like dolphins fleeing a hyperspace bypass, simply declare “[s]o long and thanks for all
the fish.” DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER’S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 156 (1979) (emphasis omitted).
31 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1349.
32 As far as I know, camels have never been the subject of study at the biennial International
Congress on the Biology of Fish. Nor are they found in the ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FISH PHYSIOLOGY
(Anthony P. Farrell ed., 2011).
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distinctions.33 The categorizations remain, despite ambiguities.34 We are not being
unprincipled when we construe a car-accident as a tort or a sale-and-purchase
agreement as a contract, and both as phenomena of private law. Such concepts
help us to understand the issue before us, giving insight into the purposes,
principles, and policies that ought to guide decisionmaking and which, for
good reason, may differ from how we approach a case under the rubric of
public law.35 The guiding considerations may adjust as circumstances
change—when selecting fish for a sea-park and for a seafood menu, dolphins
might legitimately appear within the former but not the latter—but such
adjudication is not akin to descending into arbitrary guesswork.36

33 See Stanley Fish, Anti-Professionalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 645, 659-60 (1986) (contending
that the Critical Legal Studies project of clearing away the “mystification” of legal argumentation
merely leads to one set of “interested” distinctions being replaced by another); P. John Kozyris, In
the Cauldron of Jurisprudence: The View from Within the Stew, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 421, 434-35 (1991)
(arguing that “[Critical Legal Studies] misrepresents the nature and type of communication that
makes law intelligible, predictable, and effective,” and that “CLS misconceives the balancing and
adjustment process among opposing principles that is inherent in the law and thus discovers
irreducible ‘fundamental contradictions’” (emphasis omitted)).
34 Some contemporary scholars draw sharp normative distinctions between private law and
public law. For prominent examples, see ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995)
and MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE IDEA OF PUBLIC LAW (2003). Even for those who consider the
Critical Legal Studies “onslaught” against the distinction “formidable,” the “ghost” of the
public/private distinction still subsists in legal reasoning. Michelman, supra note 8, at 309-11.
35 WILLIAM LUCY, PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE LAW 12-26 (2007); John C.P. Goldberg,
Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1648-51 (2012); Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 623, 649-51 (Jules L. Coleman et al. eds., 2004); see also ARTHUR RIPSTEIN,
PRIVATE WRONGS 292 (2016); Lisa M. Austin & Dennis Klimchuk, Introduction to PRIVATE LAW
AND THE RULE OF LAW 1, 1 (Lisa M. Austin & Dennis Klimchuk eds., 2014); Peter Birks,
Introduction to 1 ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW, xxxvi (Peter Birks ed., 2000); Turner, supra note 1.
36 I am not in this Essay elaborating a positive theory of adjudication. Others more thoughtful
than I have. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 83-85 (1986) (asserting that even skeptics
of legal interpretation invariably fall back on moral argumentation); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 204-05 (3d ed., 2012) (defending the judge’s ability to interpret laws impartially and
neutrally); NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 53-54, 63 (1981) (contending that the common
values that underlie legal and moral rules are not merely arbitrary); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 42 (rev. ed., 1971) (suggesting that a person making a considered judgment can be presumed
“to have the ability, the opportunity, and the desire to reach a correct decision . . . .”); ARTHUR
RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 199-201 (2009)
(considering the interpretation of laws (and other things) through the lens of the “ideal case of a
rightful condition”—Ripstein invokes the analogy of a malformed, three-legged horse, whose
existence does not refute the general claim that horses have four legs); Jeremy Waldron, Lucky in
Your Judge, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 185, 214 (2007) (arguing that Dworkin’s theory of
adjudication “does the most to eliminate elements of luck and unfairness from adjudication that can
reasonably be done, without making matters much worse on other fronts”). Professor Kennedy’s
thesis was, of course, elaborated in Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) and DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997).
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Liberal legal distinctions have not collapsed. That is no surprise. The law
is an art, not a science. Though it often presents hard problems, lawyers are
more than just fish in troubled waters.
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